This includes more interdisciplinary work that involves more social scientists, area specialists, and non-military practitioners e. At the same time, adaptation of data mining techniques to permit efficient application of these techniques. This should include activities to create an EBO community, such as websites, workshops, symposia, and publications. We still have a long way to go to address the issue of Analyzing Effects-Based Operations.
The mini-symposium on the first day featured papers to bring us up to speed on the state of the art on EBO thinking. The General Chairs, Dr.
Table 1 shows the list of speakers and presentations that followed. The keynote address was given by Mr. Len Hawley, former 5 Assistant Secretary of State, to provide a policy-maker's view.
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The sequence of technical presentations that followed led into progressively more detail on analyzing EBO. Table 1. This began with a special presentation by Mr. Then the participants met in working groups to examine specific topics. As with all MORS special meetings, a Synthesis Panel was formed to collect and summarize insights from each of the working groups. Table 2 shows the working group leadership which included an excellent group of energetic people. Working group reports were briefed out on Thursday afternoon. In addition, we are beginning to gain confidence that our traditional approaches to such problems are viable.
However, we are keenly aware of the major challenges that remain in assembling and applying the needed expertise, tools and data to analyze real world operations. Table 2. What shortfalls exist in this set of tools and techniques? Typically, a cascading effect flows from higher-to-lower levels of war and is the result of influencing nodes that are critical to multiple adversary systems Draft definition AFDD Typically, a cumulative effect flows from Iower-to- higher levels of war and occur at the higher levels; however, it may occur at the same level as a contributing lower-order effect Draft definition AFDD 2- 1.
They are second or third order effects, which may be functional, systemic or psychological.
Indirect effects can be delayed and typically are more difficult to recognize or predict than direct effects. Disruptions in the electric grid Andy Loerch, GMU im We considered the problem of the applicable force structure by first covering force structure issues from a variety of viewpoints. The second briefing, from OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation , presents the view that required capabilities are really specified by scenarios. We concluded the first day by discussing EBO as defined and described elsewhere in the mini-symposium.
The working group spent considerable time arriving at this final question, which covered the two principal areas of force structure analysis. Most discussions of EBO center around how to achieve effects in a particular situation; there has been much less work on how EBO can help assess the adequacy of a particular force structure, or how it can help design a future force. Consequently, we decided to limit our output to trying to answer this one overarching question. In addition, the new strategy also contains certain tenets which are means to achieve the strategic effects, and are intermediate ends , and other constructs for transformation and force-sizing.
Ability to move brigade-sized force anywhere on the globe in 96 hours. One important thing to note is that it is not easy to keep capabilities and effects separated. Most of the participants were particularly interested in the U. If we believe in achieving large effects, then clearly there must be a way to move from desired effects dissuasion, for example to concrete actions such as building and fielding an advanced weapons system.
One useful construct developed by the group was distinguishing between unintended effects which are unknown at the time the action is chosen and unwanted effects which are known at the time the action is chosen.tf.nn.threadsol.com/lawih-nokia-62-mobile.php
Applying System Dynamics to Military Operations | SpringerLink
Clearly, it is very difficult to try to mitigate an unintended effect. Our conclusion was that it probably was not, particularly if we continue to try to build forces on a capability basis that does not specify future enemies in great detail.
Such a mapping could be possible for current force adequacy studies, but it would require considerable study of the enemy. These end states are not necessarily effects, as they tend to be in terms of geographical objectives. Furthermore, many of the smaller-scale contingencies the US prosecutes do not involve combat, but are aimed at such things as humanitarian aid or peace stabilization. Conversely, many organizations in the current force are starting to work in terms of effects for Command and Control C2 , deliberate planning, force posture, and assurance of allies.
Such actions are not new, but the notion of trying to subsume these actions into a theory is. Unfortunately, our current command arrangements do not work with organizations that deal in other instruments of national power diplomacy, economic measures, and so on until the very highest level of decision making in the US government.
It is unlikely that we can avoid unintended or undesired effects at the operational and tactical levels if the intended effects are not communicated and reconciled with other organizations. There was no disagreement that doing this will be a tremendous challenge. The scenarios must reflect enduring national interests, and we must be able to assess how a particular force alternative achieves the overarching strategic effects.
Each scenario must reflect an enduring interest and contain desired effects; each force alternative will have some degree of the necessary capabilities to achieve these effects. All agreed this is radically different from how we do force structure design now. Where are we on the continuum - Wargames - concepts, fuzzy stuff; Experiments - playing with something; Exercises - training - validating concepts and moving into doctrine where it becomes useful to the field.
What do we need to look at to give information back to the Commander. Need both qualitative and quantitative tools and need to figure out what we do well and what needs improvement.
To develop CONOPS and processes we need to consider quantitative, qualitative and multi-disciplinary approaches and then determine a strategy to experiment and ascertain what is good and what is bad. Once we know the good and the bad, we can develop a strategy to move from wargames, through experiments, to exercises. This progression should show us what changes to DOTmLpf may be necessary as we approach fielding. Then we need tools to assist assessment to evaluate effects and feed them back to players. They rarely optimize at the higher levels e.
Depends on game objectives. Leadership description must be included in game descriptors. Also demographics, cultural, economic, societal, and historical considerations. We need to do the up front work to change EBO from merely interesting to compelling. Before we make EBO compelling, we need to spend some time thinking about our definition of success.
Did it work?
Applying System Dynamics to Military Operations
Was it used? These too must include a mixture of quantitative and qualitative tools representing a multi-disciplinary approach. Additionally, the same action may produce conflicting and contradictory effects and to analyze the causal links by tracing effects back to actions. Leader development will depend on moving the concept from wargaming and experiments in to exercises. These focus questions were provided by workshop leaders. After we worked on question 1 for a couple hours we realized that we needed to answer question 2 first.
Once we determined what was different about EBO indicators as opposed to attrition we were able to proceed. First we looked a complex but non-adaptive system and described the characteristics of Indicators of Success IOS as shown in the slide.
Actions taken in one domain can produce changes in other domains and also cause changes that are unrelated or unintended in all domains. In a complex adaptive system the temporal dimension is added. The transition through states may change over time and the desired end state also may change as we observe the adaptation of the adversary to our actions. Although these belong to country Green, they have been illegally occupied by Red - Red has threatened to close the strait JTF Task objectives: 1.
Return control of islands to Green 2. Maintain freedom of navigation in region 3.